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Abstract: Data Warehouses (DW) manage enterprise information that is queried for decision 
making purposes by using On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) tools. The establishment of 
security constraints in all development stages and operations of the DW is highly important 
since otherwise, unauthorized users may discover vital business information.  
The final users of OLAP tools access and analyze the information from the corporate DW by 
using specific views or cubes based on the multidimensional modelling containing the facts and 
dimensions (with the corresponding classification hierarchies) that a decision maker or group of 
decision makers are interested in. Thus, it is important that security constraints will be also 
established over this metadata layer that connects the DW’s repository with the decision 
makers, that is, directly over the multidimensional structures that final users manage. In doing 
so, we will not have to define specific security constraints for every particular user, thereby 
reducing the developing time and costs for secure OLAP applications. 
In order to achieve this goal, a model driven architecture to automatically develop secure 
OLAP applications from models has been defined. This paper shows the benefits of this 
architecture by applying it to a case study in which an OLAP application for an airport DW is 
automatically developed from models. The architecture is composed of: (1) the secure 
conceptual modelling by using a UML profile; (2) the secure logical modelling for OLAP 
applications by using an extension of CWM; (3) the secure implementation into a specific 
OLAP tool, SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS); and (4) the transformations needed to 
automatically generate logical models from conceptual models and the final secure 
implementation. 
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1 Introduction  
Data Warehouses manage a vast amount of sensitive information which has to be 
properly assured, since this information has a great strategic value for the 
organizations and furthermore is used to include private data of individuals 
[Thuraisingham et al., 2007]. In this sense, information confidentiality is the main 
problem related to security to be tackled in the access to the data warehouse, due to 
final users will only carry out reading operations [Priebe and Pernul, 2001][Blanco et 
al., 2009][Trujillo et al., 2009]. 
Security has been traditionally considered in the final implementation of the data 
warehouse, but its inclusion in early development stages can produce more robust and 
higher quality solutions, due to security requirements are taken into account to make 
design decisions and the system can accommodate them in a more natural way 
[Fernández-Medina et al., 2009][Blanco et al., 2011]. 
On the other hand, given that the data warehouse design process involves the 
traditional development stages in which the system is modeled at business, 
conceptual, logical level and eventually the final solution is implemented, model 
driven engineering approach can be applied [OMG, 2003][Inmon, 2008][Mundy et 
al., 2011]. 
There are proposal for developing secure data warehouses based on the 
automated development of the software by means of models definition and 
transformations between models, by reducing as a consequence the development 
times and costs [Fernández-Medina et al., 2007]. However, data warehouses used to 
be partially replicated in departmental data warehouses, which are focused on 
different users and business goals and examined by users with OLAP applications by 
carrying out analysis sessions where certain information is queried and grouped by 
different detail levels. 
Despite of security measures can be applied on the central repository of the data 
warehouse, they can generate inconsistencies with the access layer, in which OLAP 
tools that enable users to access to the data warehouse are located. This is due to 
security specifications carried out on the data warehouse repository do not use related 
concepts about OLAP technology (such as cubes, aggregation levels, roll-up and drill-
down operations, etc.) and are not specifically defined for each multidimensional 
view included in the departmental data warehouses accessed by users. Therefore, it is 
necessary an approach for OLAP applications which supports the definition of 
security constraints about the same views and multidimensional elements which will 
be managed by the final users when querying the data warehouse and which consider 
how these users interact with the data warehouse by means of OLAP operations 
[Thuraisingham et al., 2007]. 
This paper uses a case study to present an approach for the development of secure 
data warehouses focused on the OLAP technology, by means of including the security 
in an intermediate layer to be used by OLAP applications to access to the data 
warehouse information. This proposal is integrated into a previous architecture which 
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adopts the model driven engineering paradigm to model the DW repository and 
automatically generate its secure implementation according to a relational approach. 
In order to achieve this goal the models and transformations needed to develop 
secure OLAP applications have been defined: (i) A previous UML profile for the 
conceptual modeling of secure data warehouses has been used and improved; (ii) A 
new logical metamodel for secure OLAP application has been defined based on 
CWM; (iii) The connection between conceptual and logical models has been achieved 
by developing QVT transformations; and (iv) The eventually secure implementation 
into SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS) from logical models has been automated 
developing MOFScript rules. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will present the related 
work on developing secure DWs and OLAP applications; Section 3 will briefly show 
our MDA approach for developing secure OLAP applications; Sections 4, 5 and 6 
will describe our proposal by using a case study of an airport DW: conceptual 
modeling (Section 4); transformation to logical models for OLAP (Section 5); and 
transformation to SSAS implementation (Section 6); Section 7 will describe the 
lessons learned after carrying out this case study; and Section 8 will finally present 
our conclusions and future work.   
2 Related Work 
Firstly, several relevant works concerning with a complete secure development of 
information systems can be found. UMLsec [Jurjens, 2004][Jurjens and Schmidt, 
2011] uses UML to define and evaluate security specifications using formal 
semantics. TROPOS is a methodology for software development based on the 
intentional goals of agents which provides an extension called Secure TROPOS 
[Giorgini et al., 2006] that allows us to model and analyze security requirements 
within functional requirement. Model Driven Security (MDS) [Basin et al., 2006] 
uses the MDA approach to include security properties in high-level system models 
and to automatically generate secure system architectures. Within the context of 
MDS, SecureUML [Lodderstedt et al., 2002] is proposed as an extension of UML for 
modeling a generalized role based access control. Mokum [van de Riet, 2008] which 
is an active object oriented knowledge based system for modeling which permits the 
specification of security and integrity constraints, and the automatic code generation. 
On the other hand there are processes for building security systems which are based 
on security models and standards. For instance the process PSSS (Process to Support 
Software Security) [Barreto et al., 2010] which is based on the activities derived from 
SSE-CMM [SSE-CMM, 2003], ISO/IEC 15408 [ISO/IEC, 2005], ISO/IEC 27002 
[ISO/IEC, 2005] and OCTAVE [Alberts and Dorofee, 2002]. Nevertheless, although 
these are relevant contributions on secure information systems development they do 
not are specifically focused on DWs and their specific security problems. 
A typical DW’s architecture is composed of several layers (Figure 1): 
heterogeneous data sources; ETL (extraction/transformation/load) processes which 
extract and transform data from these data sources and load the information into the 
DW; the repository of the DW, where data are stored; and DBMS and OLAP tools 
which analyze data. Since DWs mainly dealt with read operations over sensitive 
information used for the decision making, the main security problem related with 
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DWs is information confidentiality and should be taken into account in all layers and 
operations of the DW [Thuraisingham et al., 2007].  
Each layer of this architecture presents specific security concerns which are 
following described. 
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Figure 1: A Data Warehouse Architecture 
2.1 Data Sources and ETL Processes 
Since data sources are heterogeneous and can use different security policies (such us, 
discretional access control - DAC, mandatory access control - MAC or role based 
access control - RBAC), the security problem concerning this layer is related with 
their integration into the DW design and similar to the same problem in Federated 
Information Systems (FIS).  
There are sensitive data (for instance, according to legal regulations) which 
should be assured regardless to final users (maybe different from those of data 
sources), to define an integrated security policy is an interesting starting point to 
establish security constraints in the DW. There several works related with the 
integration of different security policies in FIS [Thuraisingham, 1994][Jajodia and 
Wijesekera, 2001]. Saltor et al. [Saltor et al., 2002] use this parallelism to adapt a 
design architecture for FIS to DWs, and also to improve it with security capabilities 
supporting the integration of MAC policies.  
On the other hand, since ETL processes extract and transform information from 
data sources which is finally loaded into the DW, it is important that ETL processes 
take also security information into account. However, although exist proposals for 
conceptual modeling ETL processes with an own notation [Simitsis and Vassiliadis, 
2007] or by using a UML approach [Trujillo and Luján-Mora, 2003], nowadays they 
do not support security issues.  
2.2 Data Warehouse’s Repository 
Concerning with a complete secure DWs development we solely found the 
methodology of Priebe and Pernul [Priebe and Pernul, 2001] in which the authors 
analyze security requirements and their implementation into commercial tools by 
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hiding multidimensional elements such as cubes, measures, slices and levels. They 
extend their proposal with a DW’s representation at conceptual level with ADAPTed 
UML, but do not establish the connection between models in order to allow automatic 
transformations. 
On the other hand, there are several works focused on the secure modeling for 
DWs at certain abstraction levels. At business level there are proposals based on 
ontologies, business process, UML, etc. but solely Paim and Castro [Paim and Castro, 
2003] include security requirements, however they do not offer any formal 
metamodel.  
At the conceptual level there are interesting works for modeling DWs considering 
their special characteristics by using extensions of the ER model, UML or an own 
notation, but they do not include security capabilities [Golfarelli et al., 1998][Sapia et 
al., 1998][Tryfona et al., 1999][Binh et al., 2000][Abelló et al., 2006][Luján-Mora et 
al., 2006][Prat et al., 2006]. The conceptual modeling of security issues is solely 
considered by the AdaptedUML of Priebe and Pernul [Priebe and Pernul, 2001]. 
Traditionally, the multidimensional modeling at logical level has depended of the 
DBMS used and, in this way can be mainly classified in online analytical processing 
over a relational (ROLAP), multidimensional (MOLAP) and hybrid (HOLAP) 
approaches. There are many modeling proposals which do not consider security but 
solely CWM [CWM, 2003] provides a formal metamodel with relational and 
multidimensional packages.  
2.3 OLAP Applications 
Final tools have also to consider security constraints in order to avoid unauthorized 
accesses. Research efforts have been traditionally carried out in this way but focused 
on the final stage of development without including security issues in the whole 
development process. For instance, Kirkgoze et al. propose to define a virtual cube for 
each subject [Kirkgoze et al., 1997], or Weippl et al. which define an access control 
model for DWs and OLAP which allows to define the OLAP operations authorized 
for each user [Weippl et al., 2001]. 
Nevertheless, nowadays the inference problem is still a challenge in DW security 
and an important research branch [Thuraisingham et al., 2007]. Since DWs store 
sensitive data by using different aggregation levels with different confidentiality 
requirements (for example, the average salary may be Unclassified and individual 
salaries Secret), the inference problem is similar to the previously studied problem for 
statistical databases which store summarized data such as sum or averages [Shoshani, 
1997]. Some works have dealt with inference proposing query control systems [Wang 
et al., 2004][Liu et al., 2006][Sung et al., 2006]. 
Our research efforts are focused on considering security in the whole DW 
development process, from the early stages of the development lifecycle. Our 
proposal defines several models improved with security capabilities and aligns them 
with an MDA architecture, providing also the transformation rules needed to 
automatically generate the secure implementation.  
Our previous works were focused on developing the DW repository including 
security aspects from the requirement model to its implementation in DBMS by using 
a relational approach [Soler et al., 2009].  
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Nevertheless, users access the data warehouse by using OLAP tools which 
manage concepts associated with the OLAP technology (cubes, aggregation levels, 
roll-up and drill-down operations, etc.). This paper presents an approach for 
developing secure OLAP applications based on models and transformations, which 
compliments and has been integrated with our previous architecture. This approach 
allows us to define security constraints associated with the same views and 
multidimensional elements which will be managed by the final users. 
3 An Overview of our MDA architecture for Developing Secure 
OLAP Applications 
This section briefly describes our model-based approach for developing secure OLAP 
applications (Figure 2). This approach follows the OMG proposal for the 
implementation of model driven development, MDA [OMG, 2003], defining a 
platform independent model (PIM), a platform specific model (PSM) and 
transformations that automate the final implementation. 
 
 
Figure 2: MDA architecture for developing Secure OLAP Applications 
Firstly, a UML profile for the conceptual modeling of secure DWs is used as a 
platform independent model (PIM). This UML profile is called SECDW [Fernández-
Medina et al., 2007] and allows us to define the multidimensional model of the DW 
(facts, dimensions, hierarchies, measures, attributes, etc.) and to associate security 
constraints to multidimensional elements. The security capabilities that can be 
specified in the conceptual models are provided by an access control and audit model 
for DW [Fernández-Medina et al., 2006]. It permits to classify objects and subjects 
into security levels, roles and compartments, and to specify security rules to establish 
the security privileges needed to access certain information (sensitive information 
assignment rules, SIAR), to define authorizations (AUR) or auditing (AR). 
At the logical level, the system is modeled for a specific platform (PSM). A 
metamodel called SECMDDW provides the elements needed to model the DW 
focusing on the OLAP technology. SECMDDW is based on the OLAP package of 
CWM [OMG, 2003] for representing the structural elements (cubes, measures, 
hierarchies, dimensions, etc.) and permits the association of security permissions to 
cubes, dimensions and attributes.  
Finally, the OLAP application is implemented in a certain OLAP tool, adapting 
the information represented in the logical model to the mechanisms provided by the 
target OLAP tool. 
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The process of developing secure OLAP applications by using this approach, has 
been automated by defining transformations that, in a first step obtain logical models 
from conceptual models (model to model transformations specified in QVT), and 
next, generate the secure implementation into SQL Server Analysis Services from 
logical models (model to text transformations specified in MOFScript). 
This paper following describes our architecture for developing secure OLAP 
application by using a case study.  
4 Conceptual Model for Secure DWs 
The case study presented in this paper uses a DW for an airport, with several Data 
Marts for different purposes, such us Trips, Flights, Incidents or Multimedia 
information. This case study is focused on a Data Mart which manages trip 
information involving passengers who take flights in certain dates in order to reach 
destinations. This Data Mart is analyzed for airport staff, companies or passengers, 
and for instance can be used for companies to offer special prices for the top 
destinations of a passenger. 
4.1 Conceptual Model 
Figure 3 shows the conceptual model for this case study, defined according to 
SECDW. A central fact manages information about trips: price, purpose (which can 
be “tourist”, “business” or “military”), seat, distance, flight time and if the check-in 
and boarding procedures have been carried out or not. The information about trips can 
be organized according to several dimensions: passengers, baggage, flights and 
departure and arrival places and dates. 
Passenger dimension class includes attributes with personal information about 
passengers (code, name and address) and extended security information, such us 
fingerprint, passport photo, criminal record, if it is considered a suspicious passenger 
and the estimated risk index (a number from 1 to 10). Baggage dimension class has 
several attributes with information of baggage items, codes, weight and if the baggage 
has been inspected and it is suspicious. 
The remainder of the dimensions classes (Place, Date and Flight) has been 
associated with a set of base classes forming navigation hierarchies. In this way, the 
places can be aggregated by gates, terminals and airports; the dates by hours, days, 
months and years; and the flights by planes, aircraft types and companies. 
4.2 Security Configuration 
The security configuration of this case study uses a classification of users and objects 
in security compartments (SC), roles (SR) and levels (SL) (Figure 4). The security 
compartments are different airlines (company A, B and C). The security role (SR) 
hierarchy has a main system user “User” specialized into passengers and airport staff 
which is composed of security, flight and administration (specialized into boarding 
and baggaging) roles. The levels of security (SL) used are top secret (TS), secret (S), 
confidential (C) and undefined (U). The “UserProfile” class specifies the information 
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about the users which will be stored by the system: user code and name, and the 
security privileges associated (security level, roles and compartments). 
 
<<SFact>>
Trip
{SL=C}
+price
+purpose {SR=Security}  
+seat
+distance 
+flightTime
+checkIn 
+boarding
<<SDimension>>
Date
{SL=C}
+dateCode
+departureDate
<<SBase>>
Hour
+hourCode
+hour
+arrivalDate
<<SDimension>>
Place
{SL=C}
+placeCode
<<SDimension>>
Flight
{SL=C}
+flightCode<<SDimension>>
Passenger
{SL=S; SR=Security}
+passengerCode 
+name 
+address
+fingerprint
+passportPhoto
+criminalRecord
+suspicious
+riskIndex
+departurePlace
+arrivalPlace
<<SDimension>>
Baggage
{SL=C; SR=Security, Baggaging}  
+baggageCode
+handBaggage
+numberOfItems
+totalWeight
+inspected
+suspicious
<<SBase>>
Gate
+gateCode
+gateName
<<SBase>>
Terminal
+terminalCode 
+terminalName
<<SBase>>
Airport
+airportCode 
+airportName
<<SBase>>
Plane
+planeCode
+planeName
+seating
+maximunCargo 
+flightRange
<<SBase>>
Day
+dayCode
+dayNumber
+dayOfTheWeek 
<<SBase>>
Month
+monthCode
+month
<<SBase>>
Year
+yearCode
<<SBase>>
AircraftType
+aircraftTypeCode 
+aircraftTypeName
<<SBase>>
Company
+companyCode
+flightID 
  +passengerID
+baggageID
 
Figure 3: Conceptual Model 
A set of sensitive information assignment rules (SIAR) has been furthermore 
defined over some classes and attributes by using stereotypes (Figure 3). “Trip” fact 
class can be accessed by users with confidential (or upper) security level; the 
dimensions “Place”, “Date” and “Flight” require a security level of confidential; 
“Passenger” dimension requires a security level of secret and a security role of 
“Security”; and “Baggage” dimension a security level of confidential and a security 
role of “Security” or “Baggaging”. A fine grain security constraint has been 
associated with the attribute “purpose” of the fact “Trip”, permitting its accesses to 
the security role “Security”. 
4.3 Security Rules 
More complex security (SIAR) and authorization (AUR) rules have been also defined 
(Figure 5). The “SIAR_TripPurpose” rule is associated to the “Trip” fact class and 
involves “Passenger” and “Flight” dimension classes. This rule increases the security 
requirements of the fact and the involved dimensions if the purpose of the trip is 
military (“purpose” attribute). In this case will be required a security level of “Secret” 
and a security role of “Security”. 
The remainder of the SIAR rules (“SIAR_PassengerSuspicious” and 
“SIAR_BaggageSuspicious”) are associated to dimension classes and if the 
established conditions are satisfied also increase the security requirements needed to 
access them (that is the security level and role required). “SIAR_BaggageSuspicious” 
checks if the baggage is suspicious, whereas “SIAR_PassengerSuspicious” also 
checks the risk index of the passenger. 
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 Security Levels
Security Compartments
Security Roles
<<SLevel>>
TS
+name = TopSecret
<<SecurePackage>>
Airport
+sLevels = TS, S, C, U
+sRoles = User, Staff, Passenger, Security, Administration, Flight, Boarding, Baggaging
+sCompartments = CompanyA, CompanyB, CompanyC
+privileges = read
+attempts = all, frustatedAttempts, successedAttempts, none
+logInfos = subjected, objectID, action, time, response
+ownedMember = Trip, Passenger, Baggage, Flight, Plane, AircraftType, Company, Date, Hour, Day, Month, Year, Place, Gate, Termi nal, Airport
<<UserProfile>>
UserProfile
+userCode
+userName
+ownedSecInf
<<SLevel>>
S
+name = Secret
<<SLevel>>
C
+name = Confidential
<<SLevel>>
U
+name = Undefined
<<SRole>>
Staff
<<SCompartment>>
CompanyA
<<SCompartment>>
CompanyB
<<SCompartment>>
CompanyC
<<SRole>>
Security
<<SRole>>
Boarding
<<SRole>>
Baggaging
<<SRole>>
Flight
<<SRole>>
User
<<SRole>>
Passenger
<<SRole>>
Administration
<<Attempt>>
all
<<Attempt>>
frustatedAttempts
<<Attempt>>
successedAttempts
<<Attempt>>
none
+up
<<LogInfo>>
subjected
<<LogInfo>>
objectID
<<LogInfo>>
response
<<LogInfo>>
time
<<LogInfo>>
action
<<Privilege>>
read
PrivilegesAttempts
Log Infos
 
Figure 4: Conceptual Model: Security Configuration 
Two authorization rules (AUR) have been furthermore defined. A negative 
authorization rule “AUR_Company” which checks the company of the user (security 
compartment) and denies accesses to information related with other companies 
(information about flights and its related base classes “Plane”, “AircraftType” and 
“Company”). And a positive authorization rule “AUR_Passenger” which checks the 
user name (“name” attribute of the “UserProfile”) and provides access to the basic 
information of the user (name, address and baggage id). Finally, an audit rule 
“ARfrustatedAttempts” stores log information about the frustrated attempts to access 
information about trips, passengers or baggages. 
5 Logical Model for Secure OLAP Applications 
In this section, the conceptual model is transformed into a logical model for secure 
OLAP applications, defined according to SECMDDW. This transformation has been 
automated by defining sets of QVT rules for obtaining the security configuration of 
the DW; cubes and dimensions within their related structural and security aspects; and 
security permissions which represents the security rules defined in the conceptual 
model. Next, each set of rules is described by applying it to the case study. 
5.1 Security Configuration 
Firstly, the transformation SECDW2Role obtains the security configuration defined at 
the conceptual level by using security levels, roles and compartments, and defines the 
security configuration at the logical level. Our logical model for secure OLAP 
applications establishes the security configuration by using roles, since OLAP tools 
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use a role-based (RBAC) security policy. Thus, new roles are created in the logical 
model for each level, compartment and role defined in the conceptual model.  
 
<<SecurityRule>>
SIARBaggageSuspicious
+ownedSCObjects = Baggage
+condition = "Baggage.suspicious==’True’"
+thenSecInf = {SL=S; SR=Security}
+elseSecInf = {SL=C; SR=Security, Baggaging}      
<<SecurityRule>>
SIARPassengerSuspicious
+ownedSCObjects = Passenger
+condition = "Passenger.suspicious==’True’ && Passenger.riskIndex > 5"
+thenSecInf = {SL=TS; SR=Security}
+elseSecInf = {SL=S}
<<AuthorizationRule>>
AURCompany
+ownedSCObjects = Flight, Plane, AircraftType, Company
+subjects = {SR=User}
+condition = "UserProfile.securityCompartments <> Company.companyCode"
+sign = -
+privilege = read
<<AuthorizationRule>>
AURPassenger
+ownedSPObjects = Passenger.passengerCode, Passenger.name, Passenger.address, Trip.baggageID
+subjects = {SR=User}
+condition = "UserProfile.name <> Passenger.name"
+sign = +
+privilege = read
<<SecurityRule>>
SIARTripPurpose
+ownedSCObjects = Trip, Passenger, Flight
+condition = "Trip.purpose==’military’"        
+thenSecInf = {SL=S; SR=Security}
+elseSecInf = {SL=C}
<<AuditRule>>
ARfrustatedAttempts
+ownedSCObjects = Trip, Passenger, Baggage
+logType = frustatedAttempts
+logInfos = objectId, action, time, response  
Figure 5: Conceptual Model: Security Rules 
 
top relation SPackage2RoleSchema: Airport 
relation SRole2Role: User, Passenger, Staff, Security, Flight, Administration, Boarding, Baggaging 
relation SLevel2Role: TS, S, C, U 
relation SCompartment2Role:CompanyA, CompanyB, CompanyC 
relation AddMemberSRole2Role: UserProfile 
relation AddMemberSLevel2Role: UserProfile 
relation AddMemberSCompartment2Role: UserProfile 
Table 1: SECDW2Role transformation 
Table 1 shows the rules that composed the transformation SECDW2Role and 
how they are applied to each role, level and compartment detected in the conceptual 
model, obtaining the logical model presented in Figure 6. Each rule creates specific 
roles which are called with the prefix SC, SL and SR according to their source (for 
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instance “SLTS” was the security level “TS” at conceptual level). Finally, members 
for each role are added by analyzing the user profiles. 
 
:Role
+roleID = SRUser
+roleName = SRUser
+ownedRoleMembers = null   
:Schema
+id = Airport
+name = Airport  
:Role
+roleID = SLTS
+roleName = SLTS
+ownedRoleMembers = null   
...for each SR
:Role
+roleID = SCCompanyA
+roleName = SCCompanyA   
+ownedRoleMembers = null   
...for each SL ...for each SC
 
Figure 6: Logical Model: Security Configuration 
5.2 Cubes 
The transformation SECDW2Cube is composed of several structural rules which 
mainly create cubes, measures and hierarchies, and several security rules which 
transform security constraints of cubes into cube and cell permissions. Table 2 
indicates what conceptual elements activate each rule, and the resulting logical model 
is shown in Figure 7.  
Firstly, the “Trip” cube is created (“SFact2Cube” rule) with an associated 
measure group (“CreateMeasureGroups” rule) in which its properties are included as 
measures (“SProperty2Measure” rule): price, purpose, seat, distance, flight time, 
check in and boarding.  
Next, security constraints defined directly over cubes and their attributes by using 
attached security information (secure compartments, roles and levels) are analyzed. 
This security information indicates sets of authorized and unauthorized roles: a 
specific security level (SL) restriction indicates that users with the same or upper 
security level are authorized; a security role (SR) restriction authorizes users with the 
same role and its descendents; and a security compartment (SC) restriction authorizes 
users with the same compartment.  
 
top relation SPackage2CubeSchema:Airport 
relation SFact2Cube: Trip 
relation CreateMeasureGroups: Trip 
relation SProperty2Measure: price, purpose, seat, distance, flightTime, checkIn, boarding 
relation SCompartmentClass2CubePermission: Not thrown 
relation SRoleClass2CubePermission: Not thrown 
relation SLevelClass2CubePermission: (for Trip) C 
relation SecureProperty2CellPermission: Trip.purpose 
relation SCompartmentAtt2CellPermission: Not thrown 
relation SRoleAtt2CellPermission: (for Trip.purpose) Security 
relation SLevelAtt2CellPermission: Not thrown 
Table 2: SECDW2Cube transformation 
For each restriction established at cube level is created a set of positive cube 
permissions for the authorized roles and a set of negative cube permissions for the 
unauthorized roles denying cube’s measures (“SCompartmentClass2Cube 
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Permission”, “SRoleClass2CubePermission” and “SLevelClass2CubePermission” 
rules). In this case study, the “Trip” cube has a security constraint of “Confidential” 
security level, which is represented in the logical model (Figure 7) as sets of positive 
cube permissions for the authorized roles (“Confidential”, “Secret” and “TopSecret” 
security levels which are the roles “SLC”, “SLS” and “SLTS” at the logical level) and 
negative cube permissions for the unauthorized roles (“Undefined” security level 
which is the “SLU” role). 
The fine grain security constraints defined over cube properties are then dealt in a 
similar way, but in this case cell permissions related with the corresponding cube 
permissions are created (“SecureProperty2CellPermission”, “SCompartmentAtt2 
CellPermission”, “SRoleAtt2CellPermission” and “SLevelAtt2CellPermission” 
rules). In this case study (Figure 7), the cube attribute “purpose” can be only accessed 
by users with the role “Security” which is represented in the logical model as security 
permissions: positive cell permissions related with the authorized cube permissions 
(role “Security” which is “SRSecurity” at the logical level) and negative cell 
permissions related with the unauthorized cube permissions (roles different from 
“Security”) in which the denied property is specified by using a denied set expression. 
 
:Cube
+cubeID = Trip
+cubeName = Trip  
:Schema
+ID = Airport
+name = Airport
:CubeRegion
+crID = Trip
+crName = Trip  
:CubeRegionMember
+memberID = price
+memberName = price  
:CubeRegionMember
+memberID = purpose
+memberName = purpose  
...for each Measure (price, seat, distance, flightTime, checkIn, boarding)
:CubePermission
+spID = CubePermissionTrip+
+spName = CubePermissionTrip+
+roleID = SLC, SLS, SLTS
+read = true
+allowedSet = Trip
+deniedSet = null
:MemberPermission
+mpID = MemberPermissionpurpose+
+mpName = MemberPermissionpurpose+
+roleID = SRSecurity
+allowedSet = Trip.purpose
+deniedSet = null
:CubePermission
+spID = CubePermissionTrip-
+spName = CubePermissionTrip-
+roleID = SLU
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = Trip
:MemberPermission
+mpID = MemberPermissionpurpose-
+mpName = MemberPermissionpurpose-
+roleID = SRUser, SRStaff, SRPassenger, SRAdministration, SRFlight, SRBoarding, SRBaggaging
+allowedSet = null   
+deniedSet = Trip.purpose
 
Figure 7: Logical Model: cube Trip 
5.3 Dimensions 
The transformation SECDW2Dimension is focused on analyzing dimensions creating 
at the logical level both structural aspects of dimensions, bases and their attributes and 
security permissions over dimensions and attributes. Table 3 shows how the relations 
that compose this transformation are activated by the elements defined in the 
conceptual model of the case study.  
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top relation SPackage2DimensionSchema:Airport 
relation SDimension2Dimension: Place, Date, Flight, Passenger, Baggage 
relation KeyProperty2KeyAttribute: placeCode, date, flightCode, passengerCode, baggageCode  
relation NonKeyProperty2Attribute: name, address, fingerprint, passportPhoto, criminalRecord, 
suspicious, riskIndex, handBaggageCode, numberOfItems, totalWeight, inspected, suspicious 
relation CreateOwnedHierarchies: Place, Date, Flight 
relation ProcessSBase: Gate, Terminal, Airport, Hour, Day, Month, Year, Plane, Aircraft, Company  
relation SBase2Attributes: Gate, Terminal, Airport, Hour, Day, Month, Year, Plane, Aircraft, 
Company 
relation SCompartmentClass2DimensionPermission: Not thrown 
relation SRoleClass2DimensionPermission: (for Baggage) Security, Baggaging and their 
descendants (for Passenger) Security and its descendants 
relation SLevelClass2DimensionPermission: (for Baggage) C, S, TS (for Passenger) S, TS 
relation processSecureProperty: Not thrown 
relation createAttributePermission: Not thrown 
relation createNegativeSIARAttributePermissionForSCompartment:Not thrown 
relation createNegativeSIARAttributePermissionForSRole: Not thrown 
relation createNegativeSIARAttributePermissionForSLevel:Not thrown 
Table 3: SECDW2Dimension transformation 
Dimension classes in the conceptual models are transformed into the 
corresponding Dimensions in the logical model (“SDimension2Dimension” rule). 
Then, the properties of the dimension are transformed into a key attribute 
(“KeyProperty2KeyAttribute” rule) and the remainder of dimension attributes 
(“NonKeyProperty2Attribute” rule).  
Furthermore, for each base class directly related with a dimension is created a 
classification hierarchy (“CreateOwnedHierarchies” rule). The remainder base classes 
are transformed as the different aggregation levels of the hierarchies (“ProcessSBase” 
rule). Finally, each base class attribute is added as dimension attributes into the 
related dimension (“SBase2Attributes” rule) by using specific attribute names formed 
with the name of the base as prefix.  
Figure 8 partially shows the logical model for our case study, focusing on “Place” 
dimension. The “Place” dimension has been represented together with its key attribute 
“placeCode” and its related base classes (“Gate”, “Terminal” and “Airport”) which 
have been transformed into the hierarchy “PlaceHierarchy0”, several aggregation 
levels (“Gate”, “Terminal” and “Airport” levels). Finally, the attributes of the base 
classes are included as attributes of the “Place” dimension (for instance 
“GategateCode” attribute). 
The remainder of the dimension rules is focused on transforming security 
constraints directly defined over dimensions, bases and their attributes at the 
conceptual level. These security constraints indicate the security privileges (security 
compartment, role and level) which are needed to access the information. 
When a security constraint is established involving a dimension, at the logical 
level positive and negative dimension permissions for the authorized and 
unauthorized roles are set up (“SCompartmentClass2DimensionPermission”, 
“SRoleClass2DimensionPermission” and “SLevelClass2DimensionPermission” 
rules).  
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:Dimension
+dimensionID = Place
+dimensionName = Place  
:DimensionMember
+memberID = GategateCode
+memberName = GategateCode
:DimensionMember
+memberID = placeCode
+memberName = placeCode
:Hierarchy
+hierarchyID = PlaceHierarchy0
+hierarchyName = PlaceGate
:Level
+levelID = Gate
+levelName = Gate
:Schema
+ID = Airport
+name = Airport
:Cube
+cubeID = Trip
+cubeName = Trip  
:DimensionMember
+memberID = GategateName
+memberName = GategateName
:Level
+levelID = Airport
+levelName = Airport
:Level
+levelID = Terminal
+levelName = Terminal
ownedKeyMember
ownedMembers
:DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionPlace+
+spName = DimensionPermissionPlace+
+roleID = SLC, SLS, SLTS
+read = true
+allowedSet = Place
+deniedSet = null   
:DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionPlace-
+spName = DimensionPermissionPlace-
+roleID = SLU
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = Place   
:DimensionMember
+memberID = TerminalterminalCode
+memberName = TerminalterminalCode
:DimensionMember
+memberID = TerminalterminalName
+memberName = TerminalterminalName
:DimensionMember
+memberID = AirportairportCode
+memberName = AirportairportCode
:DimensionMember
+memberID = AirportairportName
+memberName = AirportairportName  
Figure 8: Logical Model: dimension Place 
Figure 8 shows the dimension permissions created for “Place” dimension. “Place” 
dimension has a restriction of “Confidential” security level and have been therefore 
established positive permissions for users with the same or upper security level 
(“SLC”, “SLS” and “SLTS” roles) and negative permissions for users with lower 
security level (“SLU” role). These permissions include MDX expressions with 
indicate that “Place” is the information to be allowed or denied (“allowedSet” and 
“deniedSet” attributes).  
For security constraints established over attributes, transformation rules create 
dimension and attribute permissions for authorized and unauthorized users, giving or 
denying access to the involved attributes (“processSecureProperty”, 
“createAttributePermissions”, “createNegativeSIARAttributePermissions 
ForSCompartment”, “createNegativeSIARAttributePermissionsForSRole” and 
“createNegativeSIARAttributePermissionsForSLevel” rules). 
5.4 Security Rules 
Complex security rules defined over cubes, dimensions, bases or their attributes are 
processed by the transformations SECDWSecurityRules2CubePermissions and 
SECDWSecurityRules2DimensionPermissions. These security rules can include 
conditions which depending of their evaluation establish different security 
requirements (SIAR) or authorize certain information (AUR). 
92 Blanco C., Garcia-Rodriguez de Guzman I., Fernandez-Medina E., Trujillo J. ...
 
top relation processSecurityRules:Airport 
relation processCubeSIAR: SIARTripPurpose 
relation processCubeAUR: Not thrown 
relation processDimensionSIAR: SIARTripPurpose, SIARBaggageSuspicious, 
SIARPassengerSuspicious 
relation processDimensionAUR: AURPassenger, AURCompany 
 
relation SCompartmentClass2CubePermission: Not thrown 
relation SRoleClass2CubePermission: (SIARTripPurpose) Security 
relation SLevelClass2CubePermission: (SIARTripPurpose) TS, S 
relation denySCompartmentClass2CubePermission: Not thrown 
relation denySRoleClass2CubePermission: (SIARTripPurpose) <>Security 
relation denySLevelClass2CubePermission: (SIARTripPurpose) C, U 
relation SLevelAtt2CellPermission: Not thrown 
relation SRoleAtt2CellPermission: Not thrown 
relation SCompartmentAtt2CellPermission: Not thrown 
relation denySCompartmentAtt2CellPermissionForSIAR: Not thrown 
relation denySRoleAtt2CellPermissionForSIAR: Not thrown 
relation denySLevelAtt2CellPermissionForSIAR: Not thrown 
 
relation createDimensionSIARForSCompartment: Not thrown 
relation createDimensionSIARForSRole: (SIARTripPurpose) Security (SIARPassengerSuspicious) 
Security (SIARBaggageSuspicious) Security 
relation createDimensionSIARForSLevel: (SIARTripPurpose) TS, S, C 
(SIARPassengerSuspicious) TS, S, C (SIARBaggageSuspicious) TS, S, C 
relation authorizeSCompartment: Not thrown 
relation authorizeSRole: (SIARTripPurpose) Security (SIARPassengerSuspicious) Security 
(SIARBaggageSuspicious) Security, Baggaging 
relation authorizeSLevel: (SIARTripPurpose) TS, S, C (SIARPassengerSuspicious) TS, S 
(SIARBaggageSuspicious) TS, S, C 
relation createAttributePermission: Not thrown 
relation createNegativeSIARAttributePermissions: Not thrown 
 
relation createDimensionAURForSCompartment: Not thrown  
relation createDimensionAURForSRole: (AURCompany) User 
relation createDimensionAURForSLevel: Not thrown 
relation authorizeSCompartmentForAUR: Not thrown 
relation authorizeSRoleForAUR: (AURCompany) User 
relation authorizeSLevelForAUR: Not thrown 
relation createAttributePermisionsForAUR: (AURPassenger) User  
Table 4: SECDWSecurityRules2CubePermissions transformation 
For representing SIAR and AUR rules into the logical model, it is needed to 
create security permissions associated with cubes, dimensions, cells and attributes in 
order to authorize and deny accesses to certain users, but it is also necessary to 
evaluate the established conditions. These transformations serve from some auxiliary 
rules in order to create the security permissions needed. 
In this way, each SIAR determines several set of users: (1) users who always can 
access the information (due to they always fulfill the requirements); (2) users who 
show the information filtered depending of the condition (which is included as denied 
set); and (3) users with low security privileges who cannot read the involved 
information in any case.  
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AUR rules are applied to the set of users which satisfy the security privileges 
specified in the AUR. Then, according to the AUR sign (positive or negative) 
permissions are set up authorizing or denying the read operation for the involved 
classes. Furthermore, the condition defined in the AUR is respectively included as 
allowed or denied set. 
The application of this set of rules to our case study is shown in Table 4. Figure 9 
shows how has been transformed a specific rule, “SIAR_TripPurpose” which involve 
the “Trip” cube and several dimensions. It evaluates the trip purpose and if it is 
“military” increases the security requirements from a “Confidential” security level to 
a “Secret” security level and “Security” ity role. 
 
:DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionPassenger+
+spName = DimensionPermissionPassenger+
+roleID = SLS, SLTS, SRSecurity
+read = true
+allowedSet = Passenger
+deniedSet = null   
:Dimension
+dimensionID = Passenger
+dimensionName = Passenger
:DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionPassengerSIARTripPurpose
+spName = DimensionPermissionPassengerSIARTripPurpose
+roleID = SLU
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = "Trip.purpose==’military’"
:DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionPassenger-
+spName = DimensionPermissionPassenger-
+roleID = SLC
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = Passenger
<<SecurityRule>>
SIARTripPurpose
+ownedSCObjects = Trip, Passenger, Flight
+condition = "Trip.purpose==’military’"        
+thenSecInf = {SL=S; SR=Security}
+elseSecInf = {SL=C}
:CubePermission
+spID = CubePermissionTrip+
+spName = CubePermissionTrip+
+roleID = SLS, SLTS, SRSecurity
+read = true
+allowedSet = Trip
+deniedSet = null   
:Cube
+cubeID = Trip
+cubeName = Trip
:CubePermission
+spID = CubePermissionTripSIARTripPurpose
+spName = CubePermissionTripSIARTripPurpose
+roleID = SLU
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = "Trip.purpose==’military’"
:CubePermission
+spID = CubePermissionTrip-
+spName = CubePermissionTrip-
+roleID = SLC
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = Trip
...for each involved 
Dimension "Passenger" and "Flight"
...for each involved 
Cube "Trip"
 
Figure 9: Logical Model: SIAR trip purpose 
In the logical model are established three sets of cube permissions for the “Trip” 
cube and dimension permissions for the involved dimensions “Passenger” and 
“Flight”. The first set authorizes users which always can access the information (SL 
>= S and SR = Security); the second one evaluates the condition for the remainder of 
the users (SL < S and SR <> Security) denying accesses if it is true (deniedSet = 
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“Trip.purpose == military”); and the last set deals with users who never could access 
the information (SL < C) denying the involved classes. 
Figure 10 shows how the “SIAR_PassengerSuspicious” rule has been 
transformed at logical level. This rule evaluates if passengers are suspicious and their 
risk level, and if the condition is true the security requirements for “Passenger” 
dimension are increased from “Secret” security level to “Top Secret” security level 
and “Security” security role. 
:DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionPassenger+
+spName = DimensionPermissionPassenger+
+roleID = SLTS, SRSecurity
+read = true
+allowedSet = Passenger
+deniedSet = null   
:Dimension
+dimensionID = Passenger
+dimensionName = Passenger
<<SecurityRule>>
SIARPassengerSuspicious
+ownedSCObjects = Passenger
+condition = "Passenger.suspicious==’True’ && Passenger.riskIndex > 5"        
+thenSecInf = {SL=TS; SR=Security}
+elseSecInf = {SL=S}
:DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionPassengerSIARPassengerSuspicious
+spName = DimensionPermissionPassengerSIARPassengerSuspicious
+roleID = SLS
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = "Passenger.suspicious==’True’ && Passenger.riskIndex > 5"
:DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionPassenger-
+spName = DimensionPermissionPassenger-
+roleID = SLC, SLU
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = Passenger
 
Figure 10: Logical Model: SIAR passenger suspicious 
Three sets of dimension permissions are thus created: (1) authorizing users who 
always can access the information (SL >= TS and SR = Security); (2) denying the 
remainder of the users if they do not satisfy the condition (SL < TS and SR <> 
Security) by using the condition as denied set; and (3) denying users who never can 
access (SL < S) by using the dimension name as denied set. 
On the other hand, the transformation of an example AUR rule has been also 
included in Figure 11. This rule, called “AUR_Company”, is a negative authorization 
rule which denies accesses to flights information (“Flight” dimension class and their 
related base classes) of companies different from the security compartment of the 
user. A specific dimension permission for all the users is therefore created including 
the condition as denied set.  
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 :DimensionPermission
+spID = DimensionPermissionFlightAURCompany
+spName = DimensionPermissionFlightAURCompany
+roleID = SRUser
+read = true
+allowedSet = null
+deniedSet = "UserProfile.securityCompartments <> Company.companyCode"   
:Dimension
+dimensionID = Flight
+dimensionName = Flight
<<AuthorizationRule>>
AURCompany
+ownedSCObjects = Flight, Plane, AircraftType, Company
+subjects = {SR=User}
+condition = "UserProfile.securityCompartments <> Company.companyCode"
+sign = -
+privilege = read
 
Figure 11: Logical Model: AUR company 
6 Secure Implementation 
Once the logical model for secure OLAP applications has been obtained, this model is 
transformed into a secure implementation for a specific OLAP tool. In this case, we 
have defined in our proposal a set of model to text transformations (in MOFScript) 
that allow us to automatically generate a secure implementation for SQL Server 
Analysis Services. 
These transformation create the meta-information needed to implement the OLAP 
cubes into SSAS which uses three kinds of XML files: for security configuration 
(extension .role), cubes (extension .cube) and dimensions (extension .dim). Next, this 
section describes the application of these transformations to the case study. 
6.1 Security Configuration 
Firstly, the RBAC security policy represented in the logical model is transformed 
generating an XML file for each role. Table 5 shows the XML file for the role 
“SLTS” that represents the security level top secret. 
 
<Role> 
 <ID>SLTS</ID> <Name>SLTS</Name> 
 <Description></Description>  
<Members> <Member></Member> ... </Members>  
</Role>  
Table 5: SSAS implementation: security configuration 
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6.2 Cubes 
Next, information about cubes is processed, creating an XML file for each cube in 
which both structural aspects and security permissions are specified.  
Table 6 shows the XML file for the cube “Trip”. It indicates information about 
the measures associated to the cube: price, purpose, etc. organized in a measure 
group. Then specifies the dimensions associated with the cube “Trip” (Passenger, 
Flight, etc.) and for each one defines its attributes and classification hierarchies. 
 
<Cube> <ID>Trip</ID><Name>Trip</Name>   
   <MeasureGroups>  
      <MeasureGroup> <ID>Trip</ID><Name>Trip</Name>  
         <Measures>  
            <Measure><ID>price</ID><Name>price</Name></Measure>          
            <Measure><ID>purpose</ID><Name>purpose</Name></Measure>  
         ... </Measures>  
      </MeasureGroup>  </MeasureGroups>  
   <Dimensions>  
   <Dimension>  
      <ID>Passenger</ID><Name>Passenger</Name> <DimensionID>Passenger</DimensionID>     
      <Attributes> <Attribute><AttributeID>passengerCode</AttributeID> </Attribute>     
         <Attribute><AttributeID>name</AttributeID></Attribute>  
      ... </Attributes>  
    </Dimension>  
   <Dimension> <ID>Flight</ID><Name>Flight</Name> <DimensionID>Flight</DimensionID> 
      <Attributes>  
         <Attribute><AttributeID>flightCode</AttributeID></Attribute> </Attributes>  
      <Hierarchies>  
         <Hierarchy> <HierarchyID>FlightHierarchy0</HierarchyID></Hierarchy>  </Hierarchies>  
   </Dimension>... </Dimensions> </Cube>  
Table 6: SSAS implementation: cubes 
<Cube> <ID>Trip</ID> <Name>Trip</Name>  
<CubePermissions>  
   <CubePermission>  
      <ID>CubePermissionTrip+SLTS</ID> <Name>CubePermissionTrip+</Name>        
      <RoleID>SLTS</RoleID>  
      <Process>true</Process><Read>Allowed</Read>  
      <DimensionPermissions>     
            <DimensionPermission> <CubeDimensionID>Trip</CubeDimensionID>  
            <Read>Allowed</Read> </DimensionPermission> </DimensionPermissions>  
   </CubePermission> ...  
   <CubePermission>  
      <ID>MemberPermissionpurpose+SRSecurity</ID>    
      <Name>MemberPermissionpurpose+</Name>  
      <RoleID>SRSecurity</RoleID>  
      <Process>true</Process><Read>Allowed</Read>  
      <DimensionPermissions> 
         <DimensionPermission> <CubeDimensionID>Trip</CubeDimensionID>  
         <Read>Allowed</Read> </DimensionPermission></DimensionPermissions>  
      <CellPermissions><CellPermission> <Access>Read</Access>  
         <Expression>Trip.purpose</Expression> </CellPermission></CellPermissions>  
   </CubePermission> ... </CubePermissions> </Cube>  
Table 7: SSAS implementation: cubes (security permissions) 
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All the security information needed to avoid unauthorized accesses is included in 
this file as security permissions for cubes or cells. Table 7 shows how several security 
permissions are associated to the cube “Trip”, one of them authorizes accesses for the 
role “SLTS” (similar permissions for other roles have been omitted in this Table) and 
the last one is a fine grain security permission that authorizes accesses to the measure 
“purpose” for the role “SRSecurity”. 
6.3 Dimensions 
Finally, the structural and security aspects related with dimensions are analyzed and 
transformed into a XML file for each dimension. Table 8 partially shows the 
implementation generated for the dimension “Flight”. It indicates the attributes of the 
dimension (flightCode that is the key attribute, planeCode, etc.), and the classification 
hierarchies with the different aggregation levels (the hierarchy “FlightHierarchy0” 
with levels “Plane”, “AircraftType” and “Company”). 
Then, the security constraints associated to dimensions or attribute dimensions 
are transformed into security permissions. Table 9 shows how for the dimension 
“Flight” are generated two sets of security permissions that authorize the roles that 
satisfy the security requirements (security roles “SLTS”, “SLS”, and “SLC”) and hide 
information for unauthorized roles (security role “SLU”). 
 
<Dimension> <ID>Flight</ID><Name>Flight</Name>  
 <Attributes> 
  <Attribute><ID>flightCode</ID><Name>flightCode</Name><Usage>Key</Usage> 
   <KeyColumns><KeyColumn><DataType>WChar</DataType></KeyColumn> </KeyColumns>  
  </Attribute>  
  <Attribute> <ID>planeCode</ID><Name>planeCode</Name>  
   <KeyColumns> <KeyColumn><DataType>WChar</DataType></KeyColumn> </KeyColumns>  
  </Attribute> ... </Attributes>  
<AttributeRelationships>...</AttributeRelationships>  
<Hierarchies> <Hierarchy> <ID>FlightHierarchy0</ID><Name>FlightPlane</Name>  
<Levels>  
   <Level><ID>Plane</ID><Name>Plane</Name>    
   <SourceAttributeID>planeCode</SourceAttributeID> </Level> ...  
</Levels> </Hierarchy> </Hierarchies> </Dimension>  
Table 8: SSAS implementation: dimensions 
<Dimension> <ID>Flight</ID><Name>Flight</Name>  
<DimensionPermissions>  
<DimensionPermission>  
   <ID>DimensionPermissionFlight+SLTS</ID><Name>DimensionPermissionFlight+</Name>    
   <RoleID>SLTS</RoleID><Process>true</Process><Read>Allowed</Read>    
   <AllowedSet>Flight</AllowedSet><DeniedSet></DeniedSet> 
   <AttributePermissions>...</AttributePermissions> </DimensionPermission> ...  
<DimensionPermission>  
   <ID>DimensionPermissionFlight-SLU</ID><Name>DimensionPermissionFlight-</Name>     
   <RoleID>SLU</RoleID><Process>true</Process><Read>Allowed</Read>   
   <AllowedSet></AllowedSet> <DeniedSet>Flight</DeniedSet>  
   <AttributePermissions>...</AttributePermissions>  
</DimensionPermission> ... </DimensionPermissions> </Dimension>  
Table 9: SSAS implementation: dimensions (security permissions) 
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6.4 Queries in SSAS 
The meta-information generated in these XML files is used by SSAS when users 
query the DW in order to provide authorized information. Figures 12 and 13 are 
screenshots of user queries that check the correct implementation of a security 
constraint “SIARBaggageSuspicious”. This security rule was defined in the 
conceptual model and automatically transformed into SSAS code. It specifies that the 
security privileges required to access information about baggages is a security level of 
confidential and a security role of security or baggage, but those baggages identified 
as suspicious requires more restrictive security privileges: a security level of secret 
and a security role of security.  
 In Figure 12, a user with a security level of secret and a security role of security, 
queries information of baggages related with airports. This user satisfies the more 
restrictive security constraints and is authorized to show information about all the 
baggages (suspicious and not suspicious).  
Nevertheless, in Figure 13, a user with lower security privileges try to query the 
same information. This user has a security level of confidential and a security role of 
baggaging. As can be shown in Figure 13 this user solely receives information of a 
subset of baggages which are the not suspicious baggages. 
 
 
Figure 12: SSAS implementation: authorized query 
7 Benefits of our Architecture 
The proposal for developing secure data warehouses presented in this paper has been 
conceived as a model driven architecture [Mellor et al., 2003][Bézivin, 2004]. Model 
Driven Development is based on the definition of models which separate the 
specification of system functionalities and its implementation by using a specific 
technology. Furthermore, the development process can be automated by defining 
transformations from models towards the final implementation. This approach 
improves the development process reducing times and costs and also improves the 
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quality obtained in the final product [Fernández-Medina et al., 2009][Mouratidis, 
2011]. 
 
 
Figure 13: SSAS implementation: unauthorized query 
The Model Driven approach has been successfully applied to different software 
development areas such as data bases [Vela et al., 2004][Li et al., 2005][Dubielewicz 
et al., 2007][Vara et al., 2007], data warehouses (Mazon & Trujillo, 2008; Vela et al., 
2010; Fernandes et al., 2010), web services [Meliá and Gomez, 2006][Tan et al., 
2006][Yu et al., 2006][Kraus et al., 2007], product lines [Braganca, 2007][Braganca 
and Machado, 2007], critical appications [Moebius et al., 2009] or real-time systems 
[Cuccuru et al., 2005][Lu et al., 2005][Wang et al., 2006].  
In this work we have aligned the development stages of a data warehouse with a 
model driven architecture. Our proposal starts with the definition of a conceptual 
model that includes booth, structural and security aspects of the DW. Then, this 
model is automatically transformed into a logical model focused on the OLAP 
technology and finally into a secure implementation for an OLAP tool. In this way we 
save time and cost in the development process. 
Moreover, the quality of the final solution obtained is also improved by using our 
approach which is focused on the security improvement. Our proposal allows 
designers to define conceptual models including security constraints within structural 
aspects. At the conceptual abstraction level designers model security restrictions in an 
easier and more understandable way than establishing security directly into the final 
implementation. The use of a more understandable model mitigates possible mistakes 
derived from managing a vast amount of code. 
On the other hand, the identification and inclusion of security aspects into the 
models corresponding to early development stages improve the final product quality. 
If security constraints are early modelled, these security constraints are considered for 
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making design decisions when the system is automatically generated by using 
transformations. So, the security constraints are perfectly fit into the final solution. 
The strategy that we have adopted to evaluate our architecture is guided by case 
studies. In a first stage our proposal was applied to several case studies such as data 
warehouses for managing hospital admissions or product sales. Next, in this work we 
have applied our architecture to a more complex case study in which we develop a 
data warehouse for an airport, managing information of flights, passengers and so on. 
The next step for validating our proposal is to apply it to industrial case studies with 
the participation of professional designers who could provide us useful feedback. It 
will be completed with a family of experiments for measuring how much our proposal 
improves the efficiency, understandability and security compared to the traditional 
development process.  
The case study presented in this paper has been very useful to improve our model 
driven architecture for developing secure OLAP applications. Firstly, a reduced 
version of this case study was applied in order to evaluate the applicability of the first 
versions of our metamodels and transformations and improve them. Next, the case 
study was extended until its final version presented in this paper which allow us to 
evaluate the correct modelling and transformation of all the structural elements and 
security constraints. Now, we describe some examples of issues detected and 
improved after applying this case study. 
Our proposal for the conceptual modelling of secure DWs was improved by 
adding new modelling elements that allows us to represent security constraints and 
complex security rules easier. For instance, a security element called 
“SecurityInformation” was introduced after detect that designers used to make errors 
when they assigned the same permission sets (security roles, compartments and 
levels) to different elements, since they had to repeat them manually. The new 
element (SecurityInformation) is a permission set that can be reused in order to 
mitigate these mistakes.  
Furthermore, complex security rules (SIARs and AURs) were specified using 
notes with OCL expressions. These expressions are difficult to analyze and they were 
not automatically transformed toward the final implementation. This issue was 
improved, by including in the conceptual model new elements for representing 
security rules and defining the transformation rules needed to obtain security 
permissions in the logical model and their final implementation. 
The logical model for secure OLAP applications is automatically obtained by 
applying transformations from the conceptual model and designer do not used to 
modify it. Nevertheless, some improvements were detected and incorporated to our 
proposal in order to achieve a better expressiveness. For instance, the logical model 
was initially composed of three metamodels (for security configuration, cubes and 
dimensions), and evolves to a unified model which was defined extending the OLAP 
package of CWM, searching for using standards proposed by OMG. 
8 Conclusions 
DWs manage vital business information which is very sensitive and has to be 
correctly assured in order to avoid unauthorized accesses. Because an early detection 
of security requirements has influence in the further design decisions providing better 
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security specifications and final products, security constraints should be considered in 
the whole development process from early stages to final tools. Furthermore, since 
users query the information by using OLAP tools which manage specific cubes or 
views from the corporative DW, security constraints should be also defined in this 
metadata layer by using the same multidimensional elements that will be managed by 
the final users. 
Thanks to our proposal we are able to automatically develop secure OLAP 
applications from conceptual models, providing a complete model driven architecture 
that has been described in this paper by using a case study. 
This architecture is composed of several security models and automatic 
transformations towards the final secure implementation: (i) a conceptual model for 
secure data warehouses (SECDW); (ii) a logical model for secure OLAP applications 
(SECMDDW) which is based on the OLAP package of CWM extended with security 
capabilities; (iii) a set of QVT transformations to automate the generation of logical 
models (PSM) from our conceptual models (PIM); (iv) the corresponding model-to-
text transformations which allows the automatic code generation into a specific OLAP 
tool (SSAS) from the logical models (PSM).  
As a further work we will complete the evaluation of our architecture by applying 
it to industrial case studies with the participation of professional designers. We will 
define a family of experiments in order to measure the improvement obtained in 
comparison to the traditional development process. On the other hand will improve 
this architecture in several lines: (i) including support for other PSM models (such as 
cloud) and final platforms (such as Pentaho); (ii) defining inverse transformations for 
allowing modernization processes; and (iii) including dynamic security models which 
complement the existing models dealing with the inference security problem. 
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